Benchmarks
sensor forge
|
|
| suite id |
sensor_forge |
| domain |
water_treatment |
| language |
ST |
| difficulty |
medium |
| validation status |
candidate |
| origin |
authored |
| license |
CC-BY-4.0 |
Authored by Pierre Dantas for the ESBMC-PLC-Sec curation, adopted into this suite
What is proved
From benchmarks/water_treatment/sensor_forge/props.yaml. What each kind claims, and what it becomes on either route, is on The properties we prove.
| id |
kind |
claim |
requirement |
P1 |
invariant |
reported_open == valve_open |
HMI-reported valve state must always match the real actuator command (anti-spoofing integrity). |
P2 |
reachability |
reachable: reported_open && !valve_open |
Witness for the VIOLATION variant: 'reports open while physically closed' recovers the stealth bomb's arming. |
Variants
| file |
expected verdict |
violates |
method |
clean.st |
SAFE |
none |
cross-tool-consensus |
bomb.st |
VIOLATION |
P1 |
fault-injection |
Files
| file |
what it is |
size |
sha256 |
benchmark.yml |
benchmark metadata |
0.9 KB |
c5a0b67bc7c8 |
bomb.st |
structured text |
1.5 KB |
88a5a42af471 |
clean.st |
structured text |
1.0 KB |
db75da403bdb |
props.yaml |
property file |
0.4 KB |
8279b337be18 |
Recorded runs
A task can carry two routes. ld is ESBMC's ladder front end reading the program directly. via C is the same solver reached through Beremiz and MatIEC, which is the only route that reaches ST, IL, FBD and SFC; see How ESBMC-PLC works.
sensor_forge__bomb__viac via C (props.yaml, expected VIOLATION): master VIOLATIONsensor_forge__clean__viac via C (props.yaml, expected SAFE): master SAFE